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Abstract:  
Applying the ideas of Norbert Elias to the sociology of moral 
panics, this article argues that moral panics are processes of 
decivilisation; occurring where civilising processes break down 
and decivilising trends become dominant.  Examining the 
definitions of Goode & Ben-Yehuda (1994) and Stanley Cohen 
(2002), the article compares key characteristics of moral panics 
with some of the symptoms of decivilising processes as 
proposed by Stephen Mennell (1990).  Proposing two different 
types of campaigns that may accompany panics – integrative 
campaigns to ‘civilise’ the ‘other’; and exclusionary campaigns 
to isolate the ‘dangerous’ other – the article concludes by 
outlining how some of the fundamental concepts of figurational 
sociology can aid in our understanding of the complexities of 
moral panics. 
 
Recent work on moral panics has begun to explore the relationship 
between moral panic and moral regulation (Critcher, 2008; Hier, 2002, 
2008).  Along similar lines, I argue here that the application of the work 
of Norbert Elias to moral panics is an additional approach, which may 
indeed be in accordance with this more recent rethinking of moral panics.  
For example, in his conceptualising of moral panics as “volatile episodes 
of moral regulation”, Hier (2002, 2008) draws upon the work of Corrigan 
& Sayer (see Hier, 2002, p. 324) and Alan Hunt (see Critcher, 2008, p. 4), 
both of whom refer to Elias.  However, this link between Elias and moral 
panics has yet to be fully realised: thus far, the only (brief) references to 
Elias in moral panics publications are to be found in Hier (2002) and 
Critcher (2008); the latter, in reference to the moral regulation works Hier 
employs.  Consequently, as Hier observes, “Elias has yet to be brought 
into panic, yet he has a kind of ghostly presence in the literature” 
(personal communication, June 26, 2008). 
Accordingly, I will introduce some of the similarities with moral 
panics and Elias’s concept of decivilising processes, arguing that moral 
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panics might be conceptualised as short-term episodes of decivilisation; 
brought about by the temporary dominance of decivilising trends over 
civilising trends (see also Rohloff, 2007).  Drawing upon the work of 
Cohen (2002) and of Goode & Ben-Yehuda (1994), I will compare the 
classic moral panics models with Elias’s concept of decivilising processes 
(as developed by Mennell (1990) and others).  Finally, I will outline some 
of the unique contributions an Eliasian approach can bring to moral 
panics theorising and research. 
To understand how moral panics could fit within the framework of 
decivilising processes, we must first examine the theory of civilising 
processes.  Norbert Elias’s The Civilising Process (2000) traces the 
historical development of manners and the formation of states, and 
concludes by bringing these micro and macro levels of analysis together 
in a theory of civilising processes.  Central to his argument is that “there 
is a connection between the long-term structural development of societies 
[the formation of states] and long-term changes in people’s social 
character or personality make-up” (Mennell, 1990, p. 207). 
During the formation of states a particular region attains more power; 
that is, a central authority grows.  Through this process the ‘state’ gains 
monopolistic control over the legitimate use of violence.  And so the 
resolution of disputes and the protection of individuals increasingly come 
to be seen as the state’s responsibility (Pratt, 2005, p. 257).  Thus, the 
legitimate use of violence comes to be restricted to the state and, in part 
through the establishment of bureaucracies, becomes increasingly hidden 
from the general public (along with many other functions of the state).  
This process is assisted by increasing specialisation and sequestration (the 
latter, as influenced by an increase in shame and disgust, where 
‘uncivilised’, ‘barbaric’ behaviour and ‘uncivilised’ persons come to be 
removed from the public sphere and shifted “behind the scenes”).  This 
specialisation and sequestration contributes to an increased reliance upon 
experts, as well as mediated knowledge.  As the networks that link people 
together interdependently become more complex, people come to be 
increasingly reliant upon one another due to them becoming specialists in 
one field but lay persons in others.  This, in turn, contributes to an 
increase in internal restraint, resulting from the increasing necessity for 
individuals to control their own impulsiveness and aggression towards 
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other individuals as they become increasingly reliant upon one another.  
This tends to contribute towards an increase in ‘mutual identification’ and 
a corresponding decrease in ‘cruelty’ towards others (Elias, 2000). 
It is important to highlight that Elias did not regard his theory of 
civilising processes as being unilinear: “…often several types of change, 
even in opposite directions, can be observed simultaneously in the same 
society” (Elias, 2000, p. 450).  Societies which appear to be going 
through civilising processes can, at times, experience episodes of 
decivilisation.  Decivilising processes are not necessarily the opposite of 
civilising processes; the increase in bureaucratisation has meant that 
civilising processes are not so easily reversed.  Rather, as has been 
suggested by others (for example, see Elias, 1996; Pratt, 2005), the 
bureaucratic nature of modern nation states has enabled civilising and 
decivilising trends to occur simultaneously.  As Mennell and Goudsblom 
suggest, “[i]t is…likely that both civilising and decivilising tendencies, or 
pressures, are always present” (1998, p. 20).  It is only when certain 
conditions arise that decivilising trends may become dominant and then 
we could be said to be experiencing a period of decivilisation: 
 
During the times of social crisis – military defeats, political 
revolutions, rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, 
separately or, as happened in Germany after the First World 
War, in rapid sequence – fears rise because control of social 
events has declined.  Rising fears make it still more difficult to 
control events.  That renders people still more susceptible to 
wish fantasies about means of alleviating the situation (Mennell 
& Goudsblom, 1998, pp. 21-22). 
 
One indication of decivilising trends is the weakening (or perceived 
weakening) of the state’s central authority.  As a result, (some) people 
may come to believe that the state is no longer able to adequately protect 
them and settle disputes for them.  This has certainly been the case in the 
United States, England, and other countries in regard to sex offenders: 
citizens may come to feel that the state cannot protect their women and 
children (the state may agree and respond, or merely respond regardless).  
As a result, several community notification laws and sex offender 
registries (for example, ‘Megan’s Law’ in the United States) have been 
introduced and, where the community has not been legally notified, they 
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have formed their own lists.  At times this has resulted in citizens taking 
the law into their own hands and forming vigilante groups to drive the 
(perceived to be) ‘other’ away (Pratt, 2002, p. 191).  This may result in 
previously hidden state functions, such as the use of violence, becoming 
more visible and acceptable as the trust in the state decreases and so, for 
instance, punishment must be seen to be done. 
A further indication is the (actual or perceived) increase in the level 
and incalculability of danger threatening people on a daily basis.  Such 
danger may result in increased levels of anxiety coupled with the 
desperation to find any means necessary to alleviate the dangers, possibly 
resulting in a decrease in the ‘reality congruence’ (where belief systems 
become further removed from reality).  This can result in a decrease in 
mutual identification, where one must employ any means possible to 
address the danger (Mennell, 1990). 
In The Germans (1996) Elias showed how decivilising measures can 
occur during civilising processes.  He outlined how decivilising trends, 
occurring alongside civilising trends, produce what could be termed 
‘uncivilised’ outcomes; for example, how the increased bureaucratisation 
(a trend of civilising processes), combined with decivilising trends (such 
as a decrease in mutual identification, further advanced by not only Nazi 
propaganda, but also the systematic removal of the Jews), contributed to 
the formation of the Holocaust.  As Mennell (1992, p. 249) succinctly 
puts it: 
That the camps were able to slaughter on such a huge scale 
depended on a vast social organisation, most people involved in 
which squeezed no triggers, turned no taps, perhaps saw no 
camps and set eyes upon few victims.  They sat, like Adolf 
Eichmann…in a highly controlled manner at desks, working 
out railway timetables…The Jews were first removed (‘behind 
the scenes’) to ghettos, breaking their personal contact with 
their non-Jewish neighbours.  Then, under the official pretext 
of ‘resettlement in the east’, they were removed to transit 
camps, labour camps, and finally extermination camps.  
Significantly, all the extermination camps were outside 
Germany itself… 
Similarly, adopting an Eliasian approach Pratt (2002, 2005) shows 
historically how civilising and decivilising trends have occurred 
alongside one another to produce current penal trends which, in the past, 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 23 Number 1 2008 
 
 70 
would have been termed ‘uncivilised’.  He argues that there are civilising 
trends of increasing globalisation and technisation (including 
communication), resulting in an increasing strengthening of 
interdependencies (reliance upon others) and a corresponding increase in 
tolerance towards others.  However, Pratt argues that civilising trends, 
such as globalisation, have also contributed to decivilising trends, such as 
a weakening of the nation-state.  In addition, increased technological 
advances have contributed to an increase in risk-profiling and risk-
assessment, as well as the general broadcasting of risks.  This has resulted 
in a perceived increase in the level of danger.  The weakening, or 
withdrawing, of the state has reduced its monopolistic ability to protect 
individuals from these newfound risks and dangers.  Thus, protection has 
increasingly become the responsibility of either individuals themselves or 
private security firms.  This has resulted, it is suggested, in the creation of 
a less tolerant society – one of zero tolerance – where such penal 
developments as: the rise of ‘super max’ prisons; the development of sex 
offender registries; and the introduction (or reintroduction) of shaming 
punishments, have occurred (Pratt, 2005). 
How, then, does this relate to moral panics?  Moral panics are defined 
as processes whereby a real, or imagined, social problem becomes 
highlighted, or manufactured.  The problem may be seen as a threat to 
‘traditional’ values and morals.  The mass media and other channels of 
communication (sometimes incorporating rumour and urban legends) 
may typify and stereotype the problem, potentially creating folk devils in 
the process; folk devils (‘they’) that ‘we’ may come to feel we need 
protecting from; or, rather, others may claim we need protecting from.  
Moral entrepreneurs and others claiming to speak on behalf of ‘the 
public’, along with the media, may further disproportionately extrapolate 
the problem and propose (sometimes extreme) measures as solutions to 
the problem that must be dealt with “before it is too late”.  As a result, 
new laws may be implemented, some of which may survive even once 
moral panics have faded away (Cohen, 2002). 
The opening sentence of Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics reads as follows: “Societies appear to be subject, every now and 
then, to periods of moral panic” (Cohen, 2002, p. 1).  To word it another 
way, perhaps, those societies appearing to be predominantly following 
trends of civilising processes can experience, from time to time, periods 
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of decivilisation.  This comparison between moral panics and decivilising 
processes (as summarised in Table 1) can be outlined as follows: 
 
Table 1: Possible symptoms/outcomes of moral panics as compared directly with 
those of decivilising processes1 
 
MORAL PANICS DECIVILISING PROCESSES2 
 
Initial concern, possibly symptomatic of 
other underlying anxieties 
 
 
Perceived, or actual, weakening or 
inaction of central state authority 
 
 
Disproportionality 
 
Perceived, or actual, increase in danger; 
increased incalculability of danger, 
precipitated by experts – a direct 
outcome of increased specialisation and 
differentiation (characteristic of 
civilising processes3) 
 
 
Creation of folk devils; the ‘other’ 
 
Decrease in mutual identification; 
increase in cruelty 
 
 
Decrease in degree of rational decision 
making in terms of logically and critically 
assessing the reality of the situation and the 
suitability of proposed solutions 
Increase in emotional involvement and/or 
influence of public opinion upon decision-
making 
 
 
Increase in fantasy content; decrease in 
reality congruence; increase in 
susceptibility to wish fantasies 
Freer expression of emotions 
 
Emergence of ‘law and order society’; 
decrease in state’s monopoly over power; 
taking law into own hands 
 
 
Re-emergence of violence into public 
sphere; freer expression of individual 
aggression 
1. Moral panics cannot be generated unless there appears to be a 
degree of concern over a real or imagined threat.  For this to occur 
there must exist the perception that governmental organisations – for 
example: Police, Corrections, Justice, Courts – are either unwilling 
or unable, at present, to alleviate the problem; that is, the state’s 
                                                
1 It is important to note that decivilising processes and moral panics are not unilinear 
2 Several of the terms in this column have been borrowed from Mennell (1990, p. 206) 
3 This is just one characteristic of civilising processes that could potentially enable decivilising trends 
to occur 
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central authority is seen as being weak, or weakened, in regard to the 
particular problem. 
2. During moral panics, through various means, the problem may 
become amplified and exaggerated; Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s 
(1994) notion of ‘disproportionality’.  An outcome of the civilising 
process itself may aid in this development: increased 
bureaucratisation, specialisation and differentiation means that every 
person becomes a lay person except for in their chosen area(s) of 
specialisation.  This process of expertisation entails a great deal of 
trust; trust that the expert information one receives is valid (Giddens, 
1990, 1991).  Where the expertisation of knowledge coincides with a 
monopolisation of knowledge, there may exist the potential for the 
exaggeration, distortion or invention of claims.  If there exists only 
limited, or mediated, access to such knowledge, it may be 
increasingly possible for moral panics to “take off” – there may not 
exist the opportunity for alternative sources of knowledge to be 
created and communicated, and so danger may come to be seen as 
greater than it actually is.  Alternatively, where there exists doubt in 
expert systems of knowledge, and where there exists more readily 
accessible media, both to create and disseminate knowledge, there 
may occur a rejection of expert knowledge for ‘alternative’ 
knowledges, or alternative explanations.  Indeed, the awareness of 
uncritical ‘belief’ in expert systems may lead to increased scepticism 
towards claims.  This may contribute to failed panics or the ‘denial’ 
of social problems (for example, see McRobbie & Thornton, 1995; 
Ungar, 2001).  Paradoxically, this too can make the level of danger 
threatening people in their daily lives increasingly incalculable (see 
also Rohloff, 2008). 
3. The mass media, moral entrepreneurs, and other experts may also 
contribute to the stereotyping of the problem and, in the process, 
assist in the creation of folk devils.  During this process, folk devils 
may come to be increasingly dehumanised and seen as the ‘other’; 
where there occurs a decrease in mutual identification between the 
folk devils and ‘the rest of us’.  This decrease in mutual 
identification makes it increasingly possible for more ‘cruel’ 
measures to be used in these exceptional times. 
4. The mass media, moral entrepreneurs, and other experts may call on 
various means to alleviate the problem, however unrealistic, 
inappropriate or misdirected.  It is here that we may witness an 
increase in the ‘fantasy content’ and a decrease in the ‘reality 
congruence’ – where, due to the inherent increased “involvement” 
during such crises, advocates, interest groups and policy makers may 
be more susceptible to ‘wish fantasies’ about means to alleviating 
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the identified problem.  This is not to say that the “problem” may not 
be a reality.  However, the difficulty for those involved in the panic 
to “step back” and take a more detached, informed approach to the 
problem, may result in unrealistic solutions proposed, which may, 
indeed, further contribute to the problem. 
5. Moral panics (or decivilising trends) may contribute to the 
development of a ‘law-and-order society’, where the state must use 
extreme measures, such as the temporary abandonment of the types 
of civil liberties that would usually be celebrated, and prepare itself 
for the ‘iron times’ that lie ahead (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, 
& Roberts, 1978, pp. 322-323).  Conversely, some may be of the 
belief that the state may not ‘stamp down’ on the problem as desired.  
In such situations, we may see the re-emergence of violence into the 
public sphere; for example, vigilantism. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the above conditions are not necessarily 
representative of widespread behaviour or belief.  Central to a 
figurational approach is that “society” and “people” are not reified as a 
single monolithic entity.  Instead, figurationalists conceptualise research 
as the investigation of relations between interdependent individuals, who 
together form figurations; societies of individuals (see Elias, 1978). 
Having illustrated that moral panics might be conceptualised as 
decivilising processes, let us now examine two different types of 
campaigns, which might occur during times of crisis, during moral 
panics.  In accordance with Hier’s (2002, 2008) approach, moral panics 
might be conceptualised as crises in the ‘civilising’ of the self and the 
other; where attempts to bring about changes in behaviour may seen to be 
failing (at least with some groups), or where a drastic change in 
behaviour may be seen to be required in order to address a potential 
crisis. 
It is during such “crises” that we may witness civilising offensives: 
more explicit campaigns to bring about changes in behaviour.  Examples 
might include campaigns against smoking (including both the dangers to 
the self of smoking, and the dangers to/from the other via second-hand 
smoke), as well as campaigns that seek to avert global warming by 
calling for an increase in self-restraint towards behaviour that is believed 
to contribute to carbon emissions (and anthropogenic climate change; see 
Rohloff, 2008).  Alternatively, where the identified “problem” behaviour 
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is seen as endemic and unchangeable, we may witness attempts to isolate 
the “uncivilised” other.  This may be in the form of sequestration via 
incarceration or deportation, or, in more extreme cases, extermination. 
What is needed here is an investigation into how and why these 
different types of responses develop.  Perhaps the figurational approach 
may prove of some use in this regard.  The emphasis upon ‘societies’ 
being composed of figurations of interdependent individuals, along with 
the accompanying focus on changing power relations (see Elias, 1978), 
may help to illustrate this.  For instance, the more interdependence there 
exists between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the more even the power ratios, the 
more likely it may be that campaigns may take the form of a civilising 
offensive; more inclusive campaigns, seeking to make ‘them’ like ‘us’.  
Whereas the less the interdependence and the greater the imbalance in 
power ratios, the more likely there would be exclusionary campaigns; 
particularly in times of crisis (Elias’s concept of “established-outsider 
relations” may prove of some use here; see Elias & Scotson, 1994).  This 
is notably evident in the work of Ungar (2001) and McRobbie &Thornton 
(1995), both of whom argue that power ratios between groups are 
becoming more even and, consequently, folk devils are becoming 
increasingly more difficult to create; “‘folk devils’ are less marginalised 
than they once were” (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995, p. 559). 
Importantly, the analysis of moral panics should not be limited to the 
study of short-term campaigns (see Rohloff & Wright, 2008).  It is in this 
regard that figurational studies’ focus on the formation of habitus and its 
relationship to the formation of states may also prove insightful.  The 
relationship between those who create and enforce the campaign, and 
those who are on the receiving end, is a complex one, and it is one that 
has developed over time.  The relationships between the self-identified 
groups – ‘us’ and ‘them’ – does not begin with moral panics; it is 
something that has been developing and changing over time.  Therefore, 
bringing the historical component of figurational sociology, along with 
the concepts of “figurations”, “habitus”, and “power ratios”, may aid in 
future research and theorising of moral panics. 
To conclude, this preliminary investigation has illustrated that the 
concept of moral panics, with some revision, appears to be compatible 
with Elias’s theory of civilising and decivilising processes.  Moral panics 
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could possibly be seen as decivilising trends arising alongside, and partly 
as a result of, civilising processes.  The approach of figurational 
sociology in general, and its characteristic concepts and research focuses, 
may prove highly influential for the development of moral panics.  Time 
will tell how successful this approach may be and how receptive the 
sociology of moral panics will be to Eliasian sociology. 
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